Most companys use an account lockout policy for their directory service like Microsoft Active Directory, LDAP-system, eDirectory or their own environment solution. Locking out accounts is helpful when it comes to password guessing attacks like brute force (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/) or similar ones.
However: An attacker is able to use lockout policies, too.
The following scenario is not so old, but was already used in the last two years:
1. Attacker gains access to environment
2. Attacker creates its own administrative accounts
3. Attacker brute forces all other administrative accounts
👉This way, the attacker makes sure, that all legitime administrators are locked out.
This is an advanced threat and a not very common attack, yet. The solution for this is to make sure, that not all accounts are affected by the lockout policy. Instead very few dedicated emergancy accounts, which are normally not used and stored in a safe location, should be excluded from it. Those accounts (as all administrative accounts) should be monitored closely in your SIEM or logging systems.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
Proxmox Intel NUC crashes - Detected Hardware Unit Hang
Problem If you are running proxmox (e.g. proxmox v 8.4.14) on a Intel NUC and it sporadically crashes with the following entries in the log...
-
You can either use the GUI of the FortiGate to list all certificates, or use the CLI. Either using the commands: Using the "get...
-
The FortiGate uses OFTP (Fortinets proprietary Optimized Fabric Transfer Protocol, not Odette File Transfer Protocol ) to transfer data betw...
-
FortiGate HA-Cluster Troubleshooting using Checksums Comparing checksums of cluster units You can use the diagnose sys ha checksum show ...
No comments:
Post a Comment